Shankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India

The story

After independence, several states passed land reform laws abolishing the zamindari system to redistribute land to tenant farmers. Wealthy landowners challenged these laws, arguing they violated their fundamental right to property under Article 31. To protect these reforms, Parliament passed the First Constitutional Amendment in 1951, inserting Articles 31A and 31B and the Ninth Schedule, shielding such laws from judicial review on Fundamental Rights grounds. Shankari Prasad Singh Deo, a zamindar, challenged this amendment itself, arguing that Parliament could not use its amending power to curtail Fundamental Rights, since Article 13(2) declared any law violating these rights void. At stake was a fundamental question: could Parliament rewrite the very rights meant to limit its power? The Supreme Court sided with Parliament, holding that constitutional amendments were an exercise of a special 'constituent power' distinct from ordinary lawmaking, and thus not restrained by Article 13(2). The ruling upheld land reforms across India, allowing lakhs of tenant farmers to gain ownership of land they tilled, while setting the stage for future battles over how far Parliament could go in amending Fundamental Rights.

The facts

The petitioner challenged the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, which inserted Articles 31A and 31B and the Ninth Schedule into the Constitution to protect zamindari abolition and land reform laws from being struck down for violating Fundamental Rights, particularly the right to property under Article 31. It was argued that this amendment abridged Fundamental Rights in Part III and was therefore void under Article 13(2), which declares void any 'law' inconsistent with Fundamental Rights. The case required the Court to determine the scope of Parliament's amending power under Article 368 vis-à-vis Fundamental Rights.

The question before the court

Whether the word 'law' in Article 13(2) includes constitutional amendments made under Article 368, and whether Parliament's constituent power to amend the Constitution extends to abridging or taking away Fundamental Rights guaranteed in Part III.

The holding

The Supreme Court unanimously held that the power to amend the Constitution, including Fundamental Rights, lies within Article 368, and that a constitutional amendment made under this article is an exercise of constituent power, not ordinary legislative power. Therefore, such an amendment does not fall within the meaning of 'law' in Article 13(2), which only restricts ordinary legislative action. Consequently, Parliament has plenary power to amend any provision of the Constitution, including Fundamental Rights, and the First Amendment introducing Articles 31A and 31B was held valid and constitutional.

The principle it stands for

Constituent power exercised under Article 368 is distinct in nature from ordinary legislative power, and constitutional amendments therefore fall outside the definition of 'law' in Article 13(2). As a result, Fundamental Rights in Part III are not immune from amendment by Parliament acting under Article 368.

Provisions this case shaped

• Art. 31Compulsory acquisition of propertyupheld — Upheld validity of First Amendment provisions curtailing property rights via Articles 31A and 31B
• Art. 13Laws inconsistent with or in derogation of the fundamental rightsinterpreted — Held 'law' in Article 13(2) excludes constitutional amendments under Article 368.
• Art. 368Power of Parliament to amend the Constitution and procedure thereforinterpreted — Recognized as source of distinct 'constituent power' allowing amendment of Fundamental Rights.