Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan

The story

In the 1960s, Rajasthan's land reform laws faced a legal challenge from landowners who argued the state had violated their fundamental right to property. Parliament had already tried to protect such laws by amending the Constitution through the Seventeenth Amendment, adding these statutes to the Ninth Schedule, a special list immune from judicial review on fundamental rights grounds. Sajjan Singh and other petitioners fought back, asking the Supreme Court to declare that Parliament could not use its amending power to strip away rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution—rights that ordinary laws could never touch. The stakes were high: if Parliament could amend fundamental rights at will, what would stop it from eroding civil liberties entirely? The five-judge bench, in a 3:2 split, sided with Parliament, following its earlier ruling in Shankari Prasad. Yet in a quiet but significant moment, Justices Hidayatullah and Mudholkar wrote separately, questioning whether some 'basic features' of the Constitution might lie beyond Parliament's reach altogether. Though the landowners lost, their case planted the seeds of a doctrine that would blossom eight years later in Kesavananda Bharati, forever changing how India understood the limits of constitutional amendment.

The facts

The petitioners challenged the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964, which inserted several state land reform statutes into the Ninth Schedule and amended Article 31A, thereby shielding them from challenge on the ground of violating fundamental rights. The petitioners argued that Parliament, in amending Part III of the Constitution, was making a 'law' within the meaning of Article 13(2), which prohibits laws abridging fundamental rights. They urged the Court to reconsider its earlier ruling in Shankari Prasad v. Union of India (1951), which had upheld Parliament's power to amend fundamental rights.

The question before the court

Whether Parliament's constituent power under Article 368 to amend the Constitution extends to abridging or taking away Fundamental Rights in Part III, and whether such a constitutional amendment falls within the definition of 'law' under Article 13(2).

The holding

By a majority of 3:2, a five-judge bench upheld the validity of the Seventeenth Amendment, affirming the earlier decision in Shankari Prasad. The majority held that an amendment made under Article 368 is not 'law' within the meaning of Article 13(2) and therefore is not subject to the fundamental rights limitations that apply to ordinary legislation. Consequently, Parliament's constituent power under Article 368 extends to amending or abridging any part of the Constitution, including Part III fundamental rights. However, two judges (Hidayatullah and Mudholkar, JJ., in separate opinions) expressed doubts about unlimited amending power and hinted at the existence of an unamendable 'basic structure' or features of the Constitution, foreshadowing later jurisprudence.

The principle it stands for

A constitutional amendment enacted under Article 368 is a distinct exercise of constituent power and does not constitute 'law' under Article 13(2); hence it cannot be struck down for contravening Fundamental Rights. Parliament's amending power under Article 368, as it then stood, was treated as plenary and extended to any provision of the Constitution, including fundamental rights.

Provisions this case shaped

• Art. 31Compulsory acquisition of propertyupheld — Upheld Ninth Schedule protection for land reform laws affecting the right to property.
• Art. 368Power of Parliament to amend the Constitution and procedure thereforinterpreted — Held Parliament's amending power under Article 368 extends to Fundamental Rights.
• Art. 13Laws inconsistent with or in derogation of the fundamental rightslimited — Held constitutional amendments are not 'law' under Article 13(2), exempting them from fundamental rights scrutiny.