Life, liberty & privacy
Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation
Supreme Court of India · 1985 · AIR 1986 SC 180; (1985) 3 SCC 545
This case established that the right to life isn't just about physical survival — it also includes the right to earn a living. Poor people living on pavements near their workplaces could not simply be thrown out overnight without notice, because losing their homes could mean losing their jobs too. However, the Court still allowed the government to remove unauthorized structures from public spaces, as long as it followed fair procedures like giving advance notice.
The story
Olga Tellis, a journalist, and thousands of pavement and slum dwellers in Bombay found themselves facing sudden eviction. The Municipal Corporation, citing public health and encroachment on footpaths, sought to demolish their makeshift homes without prior notice. For these residents—rickshaw pullers, vendors, laborers—their pavement homes were not just shelter but a lifeline, situated close to their only sources of income. Eviction meant more than losing a roof; it threatened their very ability to survive in the city. The petitioners approached the Supreme Court, arguing that such summary eviction violated their fundamental right to life under Article 21, since livelihood was inseparable from life itself. The State countered that public pavements could not be privatized by encroachers and that the Corporation had statutory power to remove them. In a landmark ruling, the Constitution Bench agreed that the right to life indeed included the right to livelihood, a significant expansion of Article 21. Yet, balancing individual rights against public interest, the Court permitted the evictions to proceed, provided reasonable notice was given. It was a bittersweet victory: the poor gained recognition of a fundamental right, but not permanent shelter.
The facts
Pavement and slum dwellers in Bombay, including journalist Olga Tellis, challenged the Bombay Municipal Corporation's action under the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 to evict them and demolish their dwellings without notice or hearing. The petitioners argued that eviction would deprive them of their livelihood since they lived near their places of work, effectively depriving them of their right to life. The case was heard by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court.
The question before the court
Does the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution include the right to livelihood, such that eviction of pavement dwellers without following a fair procedure violates their fundamental rights?
The holding
The Supreme Court held that the right to life under Article 21 includes the right to livelihood, since no person can live without the means of living, and eviction from a place of residence that provides access to one's livelihood would deprive a person of their livelihood and thus their right to life. However, the Court held that eviction of pavement and slum dwellers under the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act was not per se unconstitutional since it was backed by law and a procedure established by law, but the procedure must be just, fair and reasonable. The Court directed that reasonable notice be given before demolition and ultimately upheld the Corporation's power to evict encroachers on public pavements, while emphasizing procedural safeguards.
The principle it stands for
The right to life under Article 21 is broad enough to encompass the right to livelihood, as deprivation of livelihood would be tantamount to deprivation of life itself. However, this right can be curtailed by a procedure established by law, provided that such procedure is just, fair and reasonable, and not arbitrary or fanciful.
Provisions this case shaped
AI-assisted summary from public records. Read the full judgment on Indian Kanoon.