Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum

The story

Shah Bano, in her sixties, had spent over four decades as a wife before her husband Mohd. Ahmed Khan divorced her through triple talaq, leaving her without support. She turned to a secular remedy—Section 125 of the CrPC—to claim maintenance, a right ordinarily available to any Indian wife unable to support herself. Her husband argued that Islamic law, not the CrPC, governed his obligations, and that mehr and iddat maintenance had already discharged his duty. The case climbed to the Supreme Court, where a five-judge bench led by Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud confronted a deeply human question beneath the legal technicalities: should an elderly, penniless woman be left with nothing simply because of the marriage's religious framework? The Court sided with Shah Bano, declaring that the secular promise of Section 125—preventing vagrancy and destitution—applied to her regardless of her faith. The victory was legal, but its aftermath was fiercely political: conservative Muslim organizations protested what they saw as an assault on religious law, and the government soon passed a new Act narrowing the ruling's reach. Shah Bano's personal fight became a national flashpoint on gender rights versus religious autonomy—one of India's most consequential legal sagas.

The facts

Shah Bano, an elderly Muslim woman, was divorced by her husband Mohd. Ahmed Khan through triple talaq after 43 years of marriage. She sought maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which the husband resisted, arguing that under Muslim Personal Law his obligation ended with payment of mehr and maintenance during the iddat period. The dispute reached the Supreme Court after conflicting rulings in lower courts and the High Court.

The question before the court

Whether Section 125 CrPC, a secular provision for maintenance, applies to a divorced Muslim woman despite Muslim Personal Law, and whether payment of mehr discharges the husband's maintenance obligation.

The holding

The Supreme Court held that Section 125 CrPC applies uniformly to all citizens irrespective of religion and is intended to prevent vagrancy and destitution; it is not overridden by religious personal law. The Court ruled that a divorced Muslim woman unable to maintain herself is entitled to maintenance from her former husband beyond the iddat period, as long as she has not remarried, and that mehr does not constitute a sum 'payable on divorce' under Section 127(3)(b) CrPC so as to extinguish this right. The Court also made observations urging the state to move towards a Uniform Civil Code under Article 44.

The principle it stands for

Section 125 CrPC is a secular, universally applicable provision aimed at preventing destitution and takes precedence over personal law where there is a conflict; a Muslim husband remains liable to maintain his divorced wife under this provision if she cannot maintain herself, irrespective of iddat period limitations under Muslim law. Mehr, being a marital obligation and not a divorce-related payment under the CrPC's exception, does not absolve this liability.

Provisions this case shaped

• Art. 44Uniform civil code for the citizensinterpreted — Court's obiter urged movement toward a Uniform Civil Code.