Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023
Section 51
Liability of abettor when one act abetted and different act done
When an act is abetted and a different act is done, the abettor is liable for the act done, in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had directly abetted it: Provided that the act done was a probable consequence of the abetment, and was committed under the influence of the instigation, or with the aid or in pursuance of the conspiracy which constituted the abetment.
Illustrations.
(a) A instigates a child to put poison into the food of Z, and gives him poison for that purpose. The child, in consequence of the instigation, by mistake puts the poison into the food of Y, which is by the side of that of Z. Here, if the child was acting under the influence of A’s instigation, and the act done was under the circumstances a probable consequence of the abetment, A is liable in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had instigated the child to put the poison into the food of Y.
(b) A instigates B to burn Z’s house, B sets fire to the house and at the same time commits theft of property there. A, though guilty of abetting the burning of the house, is not guilty of abetting the theft; for the theft was a distinct act, and not a probable consequence of the burning.
(c) A instigates B and C to break into an inhabited house at midnight for the purpose of robbery, and provides them with arms for that purpose. B and C break into the house, and being resisted by Z, one of the inmates, murder Z. Here, if that murder was the probable consequence of the abetment, A is liable to the punishment provided for murder.
Why this exists
This rule descends from Section 111 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and reflects a long-standing principle in criminal law: people who set criminal plans in motion should not escape liability merely because the exact outcome differed slightly from what they intended. At the same time, the law does not want to punish someone for wholly unrelated or unforeseeable acts committed by others. The 'probable consequence' requirement balances these two concerns — holding instigators responsible for foreseeable fallout of their abetment, while shielding them from liability for acts that have no real connection to what they set out to cause.
How courts read it
Under the identical predecessor provision (Section 111 IPC), Indian courts have consistently held that liability depends on whether the actual act was a 'probable consequence' of the abetment — meaning it was likely, not merely conceivable. Courts have distinguished between acts that naturally flow from a common design (such as violence occurring during an armed robbery) and acts that are independent or opportunistic (such as unrelated theft during arson), often relying on the same illustrations reproduced in this section to draw that line. This continuity of language means older interpretations of Section 111 IPC remain highly persuasive for interpreting Section 51 BNS.
Common misconceptions
- Myth: The abettor is responsible for absolutely everything the other person does afterward.
Fact: The abettor is only responsible if the different act was a 'probable consequence' of the abetment — not for random or unconnected acts, as shown in Illustration (b) about theft during arson. - Myth: This section requires the abettor to have specifically intended the different act that occurred.
Fact: Intention for the exact act isn't required — foreseeability and connection to the original plan are what matter, not specific intent for the different outcome.