Murder only happens if the killer specifically wanted the victim to die.

Courts have held that even if death wasn't the goal, if the accused intended an injury that is ordinarily fatal, it still counts as murder under clause (c).

Any provocation before a killing automatically reduces murder to a lesser charge.

The provocation must be both grave and sudden, and must not be self-invited, from a lawful official act, or from lawful self-defence — otherwise it doesn't reduce the offence.

If the accused didn't aim at a specific victim, it can't be murder.

As illustration (d) shows, firing into a crowd without excuse and killing someone is still murder, even without a specific target.

Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023

Section 101

Murder

Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder,—§

(a) if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death; or§

(b) if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused; or§

(c) if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; or§

(d) if the person committing the act by which the death is caused, knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid. Illustrations.§

(a) A shoots Z with the intention of killing him. Z dies in consequence. A commits murder.§

(b) A, knowing that Z is labouring under such a disease that a blow is likely to cause his death, strikes him with the intention of causing bodily injury. Z dies in consequence of the blow. A is guilty of murder, although the blow might not have been sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of a person in a sound state of health. But if A, not knowing that Z is labouring under any disease, gives him such a blow as would not in the ordinary course of nature kill a person in a sound state of health, here A, although he may intend to cause bodily injury, is not guilty of murder, if he did not intend to cause death, or such bodily injury as in the ordinary course of nature would cause death.§

(c) A intentionally gives Z a sword-cut or club-wound sufficient to cause the death of a man in the ordinary course of nature. Z dies in consequence. Here A is guilty of murder, although he may not have intended to cause Z’s death.§

(d) A without any excuse fires a loaded cannon into a crowd of persons and kills one of them. A is guilty of murder, although he may not have had a premeditated design to kill any particular individual. Exception 1.—Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident: Provided that the provocation is not,—§

(a) sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any person;§

(b) given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant;§

Explanation.—Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder is a question of fact. Illustrations.§

(a) A, under the influence of passion excited by a provocation given by Z, intentionally kills Y, Z’s child. This is murder, in as much as the provocation was not given by the child, and the death of the child was not caused by accident or misfortune in doing an act caused by the provocation.§

(b) Y gives grave and sudden provocation to A. A, on this provocation, fires a pistol at Y, neither intending nor knowing himself to be likely to kill Z, who is near him, but out of sight. A kills Z. Here A has not committed murder, but merely culpable homicide.§

(c) A is lawfully arrested by Z, a bailiff. A is excited to sudden and violent passion by the arrest, and kills Z. This is murder, in as much as the provocation was given by a thing done by a public servant in the exercise of his powers.§

(d) A appears as a witness before Z, a Magistrate. Z says that he does not believe a word of A’s deposition, and that A has perjured himself. A is moved to sudden passion by these words, and kills Z. This is murder.§

(e) A attempts to pull Z’s nose. Z, in the exercise of the right of private defence, lays hold of A to prevent him from doing so. A is moved to sudden and violent passion in consequence, and kills Z. This is murder, in as much as the provocation was giving by a thing done in the exercise of the right of private defence.§

(f) Z strikes B. B is by this provocation excited to violent rage. A, a bystander, intending to take advantage of B’s rage, and to cause him to kill Z, puts a knife into B’s hand for that purpose. B kills Z with the knife. Here B may have committed only culpable homicide, but A is guilty of murder. Exception 2.—Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender in the exercise in good faith of the right of private defence of person or property, exceeds the power given to him by law and causes the death of the person against whom he is exercising such right of defence without premeditation, and without any intention of doing more harm than is necessary for the purpose of such defence. Illustration. Z attempts to horsewhip A, not in such a manner as to cause grievous hurt to A. A draws out a pistol. Z persists in the assault. A believing in good faith that he can by no other means prevent himself from being horsewhipped, shoots Z dead. A has not committed murder, but only culpable homicide. Exception 3.—Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, being a public servant or aiding a public servant acting for the advancement of public justice, exceeds the powers given to him by law, and causes death by doing an act which he, in good faith, believes to be lawful and necessary for the due discharge of his duty as such public servant and without ill-will towards the person whose death is caused. Exception 4.—Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender’s having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. Explanation.—It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the provocation or commits the first assault. Exception 5.—Culpable homicide is not murder when the person whose death is caused, being above the age of eighteen years, suffers death or takes the risk of death with his own consent. Illustration. A, by instigation, voluntarily causes Z, a child to commit suicide. Here, on account of Z’s youth, he was incapable of giving consent to his own death; A has therefore abetted murder.§

Why this exists

This provision comes from Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, largely retained without substantive change in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. Colonial-era drafters (with Macaulay's original Code) sought to separate the broader category of 'culpable homicide' (any unlawful killing) from its most blameworthy form, 'murder', by pinning down exactly which mental states and circumstances make a killing the gravest form of homicide. The four clauses capture different levels of intent and knowledge, while the exceptions (only partly listed here) recognise that some killings, though intentional, occur under circumstances — sudden provocation, exceeding private defence, and so on — that reduce moral culpability.

How courts read it

Indian courts, interpreting the identical language under IPC Section 300, developed a structured test — often summarised via the 'four clauses' framework from cases like Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab (1958), which held that under clause (c) (Third), courts must ask whether the injury was intended and whether that kind of injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, irrespective of whether the accused intended death itself. Courts have also refined the 'grave and sudden provocation' exception (K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra, 1961) by holding that the provocation must be judged by the standard of an ordinary person in the accused's position, and that a long gap between provocation and killing can defeat the 'sudden' requirement. These precedents, developed under the IPC, are expected to continue guiding interpretation of the renumbered provision under the BNS.

Common misconceptions

Myth: Murder only happens if the killer specifically wanted the victim to die.
Fact: Courts have held that even if death wasn't the goal, if the accused intended an injury that is ordinarily fatal, it still counts as murder under clause (c).
Myth: Any provocation before a killing automatically reduces murder to a lesser charge.
Fact: The provocation must be both grave and sudden, and must not be self-invited, from a lawful official act, or from lawful self-defence — otherwise it doesn't reduce the offence.
Myth: If the accused didn't aim at a specific victim, it can't be murder.
Fact: As illustration (d) shows, firing into a crowd without excuse and killing someone is still murder, even without a specific target.