Article 234

The Constitution's framers wanted lower judicial appointments — the entry-level judges who form the backbone of the trial court system — to be made through a fair, competitive process, similar to civil service recruitment, rather than by pure executive discretion. At the same time, they wanted the judiciary, through the High Court, to have a meaningful say, since these officers work under judicial supervision and their quality affects the whole justice system. Requiring consultation with both the Public Service Commission (for merit-based recruitment) and the High Court (for judicial competence) balances executive authority with judicial and administrative expertise.

The Supreme Court has read Article 234 alongside Articles 233 and 235 to protect the High Court's dominant role in matters of recruitment, training, and control over subordinate judicial officers. In cases such as *State of Bihar v. Bal Mukund Sah* (2000), the Court held that the 'consultation' with the High Court under Article 234 is not a mere formality — the High Court's role in framing recruitment rules and conducting selection (often via a judicial services examination) is central, and legislative or executive attempts to bypass or dilute that role have been struck down. Courts have consistently emphasized that judicial independence requires the High Court's effective, not token, involvement in appointing subordinate judges.

• Myth: The Governor personally selects who becomes a junior judge.
  Fact: The Governor's role is formal, acting on rules and recommendations shaped through consultation with the State Public Service Commission and the High Court, which effectively drive the selection process.
• Myth: Article 234 covers all judges in a state, including district judges.
  Fact: Article 234 specifically excludes district judges — their appointment is separately governed by Article 233.